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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Marla G. Decker *
Stephen R. McCullough **
I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines the most significant cases from the Su-
preme Court of Virginia and the Court of Appeals of Virginia over
the past year. The article also outlines some of the most conse-
quential changes to the law enacted by the Virginia General As-
sembly during the 2005 Session in the field of criminal law and
procedure.
II. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Appeals
1. Appeals from Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts
The complex interplay of jurisdiction between circuit courts
and juvenile and domestic relations courts is a frequent source of
confusion and litigation. In Lampkins v. Commonwealth,' the po-
lice determined that the defendant, a juvenile involved in a drive-
by murder, had not fully cooperated as required by his "Contin-
gency Agreement for Consideration." 2 Accordingly, the Common-
wealth filed petitions in the juvenile and domestic relations court
* Deputy Attorney General, Public Safety and Enforcement Division, Office of the
Attorney General, Commonwealth of Virginia. B.A., 1980, Gettysburg College; J.D., 1983,
University of Richmond School of Law.
** Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Litigation Section, Office of the Attorney
General, Commonwealth of Virginia. B.A., 1994, University of Virginia, with high distinc-
tion; J.D., 1997, University of Richmond School of Law, cum laude.
1. 44 Va. App. 709, 607 S.E.2d 722 (Ct. App. 2005).
2. See id. at 713-14, 607 S.E.2d at 724.
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for charges related to the murder.3 The juvenile court dismissed
the petitions, holding that the juvenile had not breached the
agreement.4 After the Commonwealth obtained direct indictments
in the circuit court, the defendant contended that the circuit court
lacked jurisdiction because he had not been afforded a transfer
hearing or a preliminary hearing.' The court disagreed and he
was convicted.6 The Court of Appeals of Virginia examined Vir-
ginia Code section 16.1-269.1(D), which provides that the Com-
monwealth "is not required to appeal an adverse decision but can
seek a direct indictment: (1) where the juvenile court does not
find probable cause; or (2) where the petition or warrant is termi-
nated by dismissal in the juvenile court."7 The court concluded
that the plain terms of this provision authorized the Common-
wealth to proceed as it did.8 The court further held that Virginia
Code section 16.1-269.6(B) did not apply.9 That section requires
the court to examine the record from the juvenile court to ensure
substantial compliance with the transfer provisions and either
advise the Commonwealth that it may seek a direct indictment or
remand the case to the juvenile court.10 That statute, the court
concluded, applies only to an appeal of a transfer decision.1' In
this case, there was no transfer decision. 2
The court further clarified circuit court jurisdiction in an ap-
peal from a juvenile court decision in Overdorff v. Common-
wealth.3 The Commonwealth moved to transfer Overdorffs case
from the juvenile and domestic relations court to the circuit court
based upon the nature of the offenses. 4 The juvenile court found
probable cause but denied the Commonwealth's motion to trans-
fer the charges. 5 The Commonwealth appealed the refusal to
3. Id. at 714, 607 S.E.2d at 725.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 714-15, 607 S.E.2d at 725.
6. See id. at 714, 607 S.E.2d at 725.
7. Id. at 716, 607 S.E.2d at 726 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1(D) (Repl. Vol.
2003 & Cum. Supp. 2005)).
8. See id. at 718, 607 S.E.2d at 726.
9. See id., 607 S.E.2d at 726-27 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.6(B) (Cum. Supp.
2005)).
10. See id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.6(B) (Cum. Supp. 2005)).
11. Id., 607 S.E.2d at 727.
12. Id.
13. 45 Va. App. 222, 609 S.E.2d 626 (Ct. App. 2005).
14. See id. at 224, 609 S.E.2d at 627.
15. Id.
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transfer the charges to the circuit court.'6 At the transfer hearing
on August 26, 2002, the parties advised the circuit court "that
they had just received a copy of an order from the juvenile court"
outlining the reasons for its decision. 7 That order was dated
"'August 26, 2002 nunc pro tunc July 18, 2002.""8
The defendant argued that the juvenile court had failed to
comply with Virginia Code section 16.1-269.6(A), which requires
that all orders, including the order setting forth the reasons for
the court's decision, be sent to the circuit court within seven days
after the filing of the notice of appeal.' 9 The defendant claimed
that because the juvenile court had failed to comply with the time
requirement, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the trans-
fer hearing.20 The circuit court rejected the argument, finding
that under Virginia Code section 16.1-269.6(B), the juvenile court
had been in "'substantial compliance'" with the procedural re-
quirements of Virginia Code section 16.1-269.1(A) and, therefore,
the circuit court had jurisdiction over the appeal.2 The circuit
court then went on to authorize the Commonwealth to seek in-
dictments.22 Ultimately, the defendant was convicted of the
criminal offenses and appealed to the court of appeals, alleging
that all of the proceedings in the circuit court were null and void
because that court lacked jurisdiction.23
The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the convictions.24 The
court, citing Virginia Code section 16.1-269.1(E), noted that "'[a]n
indictment in the circuit court cures any error or defect in any
proceeding held in the juvenile court except with respect to the
juvenile's age."'25 Thus, once the grand jury returned the indict-
ment, any alleged defect was cured.26
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 224-25, 609 S.E.2d at 627 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.6(A) (Cum.
Supp. 2005)).
20. Id. at 225, 609 S.E.2d at 627.
21. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.6(B) (Cum. Supp. 2005)).
22. Id.
23. See id. at 226, 609 S.E.2d at 628.
24. See id. at 228, 609 S.E.2d at 629.
25. Id. at 226, 609 S.E.2d at 628 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1(E) (Repl. Vol.
2003 & Cum. Supp. 2005)).
26. Id.
2005]
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2. Appeals from Deferred Disposition
In 2005, the Court of Appeals of Virginia addressed a unique
jurisdictional question relating to deferred disposition. In
Randolph v. Commonwealth,27 the defendant appealed his convic-
tion for possession of cocaine." However, because the circuit court
elected to defer disposition under the first offender statute, Vir-
ginia Code section 18.2-251, the court ordered the parties to ad-
dress the issue of whether the appellate court had jurisdiction to
consider an appeal. 29 The court ultimately ruled that a circuit
court order deferring disposition of the charges is not a final
judgment of conviction.3 ° Consequently, the court dismissed the
appeal for lack of jurisdiction.31
B. Arrest on a Summons
Virginia Code section 19.2-74 establishes that, subject to cer-
tain exceptions, a suspect in a misdemeanor case is to be released
with a summons rather than a full custodial arrest.3 2 An unre-
solved issue is whether the evidence must be suppressed if the of-
ficer ignores or misapplies this statute.3 Two cases addressed the
statute in the past year.
In Moore v. Commonwealth,34 police stopped the defendant and
determined that he was driving on a suspended license.35 The of-
ficers, based on what they deemed their "prerogative," effected a
full custodial arrest and searched the defendant incident to the
arrest.36 They found crack cocaine in his jacket.37 A panel of the
Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the evidence must be sup-
27. 45 Va. App. 166, 609 S.E.2d 84 (Ct. App. 2005).
28. See id. at 167, 609 S.E.2d at 85.
29. See id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-251 (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-74(A) (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2005).
33. In Hunt v. Commonwealth, a panel of the Court of Appeals of Virginia held that
the evidence should be suppressed. See 41 Va. App. 404, 407, 585 S.E.2d 827, 829 (Ct. App.
2003). The en banc court of appeals divided evenly on the issue. See Hunt v. Common-
wealth, 42 Va. App. 537, 537, 592 S.E.2d 789, 789 (Ct. App. 2004). The Supreme Court of
Virginia then disposed of the case by unpublished order, holding that the issue was proce-
durally defaulted. See Hunt v. Commonwealth, No. 040614 (Va. Oct. 8, 2004).
34. 45 Va. App. 146, 609 S.E.2d 74 (Ct. App. 2005).
35. Id. at 149, 609 S.E.2d at 76.
36. See id. at 150, 609 S.E.2d at 76.
37. Id.
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pressed due to the failure of the officer to release the defendant
on a summons.3" However, the panel decision has been stayed and
the court will hear the case en banc.39
In Fox v. Commonwealth,4" the police recovered a gun that the
defendant had discarded while fleeing.4' The serial number of the
gun was obliterated.4 2 Possession of a concealed gun and obliter-
ating the serial number on a firearm are both Class 1 misde-
meanors.4 3 Police made a full custodial arrest rather than releas-
ing the defendant on a summons.44 A search of his person at the
police station yielded cocaine.45 Fox contended that Virginia Code
section 19.2-74 creates a wholly subjective test concerning
whether one of the exceptions applies to the general rule requir-
ing release on a summons.46 However, the Commonwealth had
not adduced any testimony at his trial concerning the arresting
officer's reason for the custodial arrest.47 The Court of Appeals of
Virginia rejected this argument, noting that objective criteria will
determine the existence of one of the exceptions found in the
statute. 48 In this instance, the evidence established that the de-
fendant could reasonably be deemed a danger to others.4 9 There-
fore, the officer properly made a full custodial arrest rather than
releasing the defendant on a summons.50
C. Color of Office
Virginia statutes generally limit the authority of law enforce-
ment officers to their jurisdiction.5' Under the "color of office" doc-
38. See id. at 157, 609 S.E.2d at 80.
39. Moore v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 279, 279, 610 S.E.2d 326, 326 (Ct. App.
2005).
40. 43 Va. App. 446, 598 S.E.2d 770 (Ct. App. 2004).
41. See id. at 448, 598 S.E.2d at 770.
42. See id., 598 S.E.2d at 770-71.
43. See id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308 (Cum. Supp. 2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
311.1 (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
44. See id., 598 S.E.2d at 771.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 449, 598 S.E.2d at 771 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-74 (Repl. Vol. 2004
& Cum. Supp. 2005)).
47. See id. at 450, 598 S.E.2d at 771.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 451, 598 S.E.2d at 772.
50. See id.
51. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-250 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
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trine, police officers operating outside their jurisdiction may not
use 'the indicia of [their] official position to collect evidence that
a private citizen would be unable [to] gather."'' 2 However, officers
in such circumstances may make a citizen's arrest.53 The applica-
tion of the "color of office" doctrine was at issue in Wilson v.
Commonwealth.54 In Wilson, an off-duty deputy sheriff from Lou-
doun County, who was traveling in Culpeper County, almost col-
lided with a convertible that improperly veered into the opposing
lane of travel.55 The deputy followed the car to neighboring Spot-
sylvania County. 6 The deputy flashed his lights at the converti-
ble in a vain effort to stop the car.57 The convertible continued
driving erratically and eventually turned into a gas station. 8
The deputy, who was in civilian clothing and in his private ve-
hicle, placed his badge and his service weapon on his belt and ap-
proached the defendant.59 The officer identified himself as a dep-
uty from Loudoun County and asked the defendant to step out of
the vehicle.6° The deputy noticed the odor of alcohol emanating
from Wilson.61 He also observed Wilson's slurred speech, deficient
memory, and his glassy eyes.62 The deputy obtained consent to
conduct a pat-down search for weapons.63 While the deputy did
not tell Wilson he could not leave, he questioned him about his
drinking and asked the defendant to perform field sobriety tests.'
Wilson refused.65 At that point, a Spotsylvania County deputy ar-
rived and arrested Wilson for being drunk in public.66
Wilson asserted that the off-duty deputy "' [went] far beyond'
what 'a citizen could or would [have] achieve [d] in the context of a
citizen's arrest' and, therefore, the evidence gathered by the
52. Wilson v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 193, 203, 609 S.E.2d 612, 617 (Ct. App.
2005) (quoting Hudson v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 371, 377, 585 S.E.2d 583, 586 (2003)).
53. See id. at 204, 609 S.E.2d at 617.
54. See id. at 195-96, 609 S.E.2d at 613.
55. See id. at 196, 609 S.E.2d at 613.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 196-97, 609 S.E.2d at 613.
59. Id., 609 S.E.2d at 613-14.
60. Id. at 197, 609 S.E.2d at 614.
61. Id. at 197-98, 609 S.E.2d at 614.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 198, 609 S.E.2d at 614.
64. See id. at 198-99, 609 S.E.2d at 614-15.
65. See id. at 199, 609 S.E.2d at 615.
66. Id. at 199-200, 609 S.E.2d at 615.
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deputy should be suppressed." The trial court denied the sup-
pression motion.6" The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed,
holding that the off-duty deputy did not stop the defendant's car
and did not arrest him.69 The court observed that while the dep-
uty identified himself as a law enforcement officer, he clearly in-
dicated that he was from a different jurisdiction and that local
authorities had been notified.7 ° The court also noted that the dep-
uty's observations of the defendant's drunken behavior could have
been gathered by any citizen.7 ' The court assumed, without decid-
ing, that administering field sobriety tests could implicate the
color of office doctrine.72 The defendant in this instance, however,
refused to perform the tests, so there was no such evidence to
suppress.73
D. Detention Center
In Charles v. Commonwealth,74 the defendant was sentenced to
serve five years in prison for a drug conviction.75 Four years of the
sentence were suspended. 6 He served his one-year sentence and
was released on probation.77 After he violated the terms of his
probation, the trial court revoked the suspended sentence, resus-
pended it, and placed him on probation.78 One of the conditions
for placing Charles on probation was that he complete the Deten-
tion Center Incarceration Program (the "Program").79 He did so. 80
He later, however, violated other conditions of his probation.8 1
The court again revoked his probation and imposed four years of
his original five-year sentence. 2 Although he had not raised the
67. Id. at 201-02, 609 S.E.2d at 615-16.
68. See id. at 201, 609 S.E.2d at 616.
69. See id. at 205-06, 609 S.E.2d at 618.
70. Id. at 205, 609 S.E.2d at 618.
71. Id. at 205-06, 609 S.E.2d at 618.
72. Id. at 206, 609 S.E.2d at 618.
73. See id.
74. 270 Va. 14, 613 S.E.2d 432 (2005).
75. Id. at 16-17, 613 S.E.2d at 433.
76. Id. at 16, 613 S.E.2d at 433.
77. Id. at 17, 613 S.E.2d at 433.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 16-17, 613 S.E.2d at 432-33.
80. Id. at 17, 613 S.E.2d at 433.
81. Id.
82. Id.
2005]
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issue at trial, the defendant contended on appeal that his time
spent in the Program was "incarceration" that should have been
credited towards his overall sentence. 3
The Supreme Court of Virginia first rejected the Common-
wealth's argument that participation in the Program was a condi-
tion of probation and did not constitute incarceration."4 The court
held that the designation of the activity as a condition of proba-
tion "is not a description of the nature of the activity." 5 The stat-
utes at issue, the court noted, "are dispositive" and establish the
fact that the Program constitutes "'incarceration."'8 6 Because the
Program constitutes incarceration, the time spent by the defen-
dant in the program must be credited toward his overall sen-
tence." The court concluded that "the trial court did not have the
authority or the discretion to enter a second sentencing order that
extended the period of incarceration beyond that imposed" in the
original sentencing order.8 8 Such an order is "void" and would im-
pose a "grave injustice" upon the defendant and, therefore, the
ends of justice exception to the rules of default enabled the court
to grant the defendant relief.89
E. Discovery
Virginia courts have long reviewed sensitive records in camera
to determine whether the contents of these records should be dis-
closed to a defendant in discovery. The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia, interpreting its own Rule 3A:12, approved of this practice
in Nelson v. Commonwealth.9 ° In Nelson, the defendant obtained
a subpoena duces tecum for the mental and physical records of
the child he sexually molested.9 ' The trial court reviewed the re-
cords in camera, concluded there was nothing material in the
documents, and declined to disclose them to the defendant.92 Nel-
83. See id.
84. See id. at 18, 613 S.E.2d at 433-34.
85. Id., 613 S.E.2d at 433.
86. Id., 613 S.E.2d at 433-34.
87. See id., 613 S.E.2d at 434.
88. Id. at 19, 613 S.E.2d at 434.
89. Id. at 20, 613 S.E.2d at 435.
90. 268 Va. 665, 604 S.E.2d 76 (2004).
91. Id. at 668, 604 S.E.2d at 77.
92. Id.
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son objected, arguing that once the subpoena was issued, he had
an absolute right to examine the documents.93 On appeal, the
court concluded that when documents "'are of such nature or con-
tent that disclosure to other parties would be unduly prejudicial,"'
the plain language of Rule 3A:12 permits the reviewing court to
examine the documents in camera to determine whether they are
material to the party that has requested them.94 If they are not
material, the court can limit disclosure."
F. Dismissal versus "Nol Pros"
In Roe v. Commonwealth, 6 the defendant was charged with
abduction and a number of associated firearm charges.97 The de-
fendant was not present when the case was called because he was
in federal custody.9" After the trial court denied the prosecution's
motion for a continuance, the Commonwealth made a motion to
dismiss the charges.99 The court granted the motion, but the writ-
ten order did not specify whether the dismissal was with preju-
dice. 1' Following the issuance of new indictments on the offenses,
the defendant argued that the prosecution was barred by the ear-
lier dismissal.10 ' The trial court interpreted the prior dismissal
order as meaning a dismissal without prejudice.0 2 On appeal, the
Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed. 10 3 First, the court reasoned
that it should give deference to a court's reasonable interpreta-
tion of its own order.'0 4 This is so even where a different judge of
the same court interprets the order. 0 5 Second, the court noted
that, historically, indictments dismissed on motion of the prose-
cution were permitted and that such dismissals were without
93. See id. at 669, 604 S.E.2d at 78.
94. See id. at 670, 604 S.E.2d at 78 (quoting VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:12(b) (Repl. Vol.
2005)).
95. See id.
96. 45 Va. App. 240, 609 S.E.2d 635 (Ct. App. 2005).
97. See id. at 243, 609 S.E.2d at 636.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 243-44, 609 S.E.2d at 636.
102. See id. at 244, 609 S.E.2d at 636.
103. See id. at 249, 609 S.E.2d at 639.
104. Id. at 245, 609 S.E.2d at 637 (quoting Albert v. Albert, 38 Va. App. 284, 298, 563
S.E.2d 389, 396 (Ct. App. 2002)).
105. See id. at 244 n.1, 609 S.E.2d at 637 n.1.
2005]
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prejudice." 6 Finally, the court observed that the terms "dis-
missal" and "nolle prosequi" are used interchangeably." 7
G. Double Jeopardy
The Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether the crime of
grand larceny from the person is a lesser-included offense of rob-
bery for purposes of violation of the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy. In Commonwealth v. Hudgins,'° the
court overruled the Court of Appeals of Virginia and held that
grand larceny from the person is not a lesser-included offense of
robbery.0 9 Applying the test established in Blockburger v. United
States,"° the Hudgins court found that "proof of violence or in-
timidation is required in a prosecution for robbery but not for
grand larceny from the person. And proof of the value of the prop-
erty stolen is required in a prosecution for grand larceny from the
person but not for robbery.""'
H. Fifth Amendment
In Dixon v. Commonwealth,"2 the police arrived at the scene of
a motor vehicle accident." 3 They found the defendant "'upset,"'
and "'unruly' and he had a "'strong odor"' of alcohol about his
person." 4 He was placed in the front passenger seat of the patrol
car." ' The police told him he was not under arrest but was being
detained for investigative reasons and for officer safety."6 When
questioned by the officers, Dixon said "he had consumed four or
five beers about an hour earlier, and that he had 'pulled' his car
106. See id. at 247, 609 S.E.2d at 638.
107. Id.
108. 269 Va. 602, 611 S.E.2d 362 (2005).
109. Id. at 608, 611 S.E.2d at 366.
110. 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
111. Hudgins, 269 Va. at 606, 611 S.E.2d at 365.
112. 270 Va. 34, 613 S.E.2d 398 (2005).
113. Id. at 37, 613 S.E.2d at 399.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 38, 613 S.E.2d at 399.
116. Id.
[Vol. 40:197
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
over to the side of the road because the car was malfunction-
ing."117 He was later formally arrested."'
Before trial, he sought to suppress those statements on the ba-
sis that the statements were obtained in violation of his Miranda
rights."9 The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the
detention was an investigative one rather than a custodial ar-
rest.12 ° The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed. 2' The court ob-
served that Miranda warnings must be provided when an indi-
vidual's freedom is restricted to a "'degree associated with formal
arrest.""22 The key for the court was the combination of handcuff-
ing and being locked in a police car.'23 The court noted that "ei-
ther of these factors, in the absence of the other, may not result in
a curtailment of freedom ordinarily associated with a formal ar-
rest.""'24 However, "the presence of both factors compels the con-
clusion that a reasonable person subjected to both restraints
would conclude that he was in police custody."'25 Because he was
in custody, he should have been provided with Miranda warn-
ings; therefore, the court held that the statements should have
been suppressed.'26
I. Statutory Speedy Trial
In Schwartz v. Commonwealth,'27 the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia found that Virginia Code section 19.2-243(2), which allows
for tolling of the speedy trial statute when a prosecution witness
is "prevented from attending" the trial due to "sickness or acci-
dent," includes when a witness is recovering from medically nec-
essary back surgery. 28 The court determined that the weakened
117. Id.
118. See id., 613 S.E.2d at 400.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 41, 613 S.E.2d at 402.
122. Id. at 39, 613 S.E.2d at 400 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440
(1984)).
123. See id. at 40-41, 613 S.E.2d at 401.
124. Id. at 41, 613 S.E.2d at 401.
125. Id.
126. See id., 613 S.E.2d at 402.
127. 45 Va. App. 407, 611 S.E.2d 631 (Ct. App. 2005).
128. Id. at 423-26, 611 S.E.2d at 639-41 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-243(2) (Cum.
Supp. 2005)).
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condition of the witness while he recovered from the major back
surgery rendered him unable to attend the trial due to "sickness"
and that the time for calculating speedy trial was properly tolled
during the continuance necessitated by the witness's condition.129
J. Immunity / Cooperation Agreements
Cooperation agreements between defendants and the prosecu-
tion are often used for the benefit of both parties. Occasionally,
however, the parties disagree concerning the level of cooperation
provided by the defendant. Such was the situation in Hood v.
Commonwealth,13° where the defendant was charged with first
degree murder and abduction for his role in the stabbing death of
an elderly woman. 13' He agreed to cooperate with the prosecu-
tion. 32 As part of the agreement, Hood made a very detailed fac-
tual proffer implicating himself and another person named Billy
Madison in the murder. 33 The agreement provided that the prof-
fer was not to be used against him in a criminal prosecution.
134
However, the agreement also stated "that if Hood 'offers testi-
mony or presents evidence different from any statement made or
other information provided during the proffer,"' the government
"could use his statements for impeachment, cross-examination,
and rebuttal."1 35
At his trial, the defendant cross-examined the medical exam-
iner concerning the similarity of the murder to other elderly
women that occurred around the same time; murders widely
known in the community as the "Golden Years' Murders." 36 The
Commonwealth argued that this line of cross-examination con-
tradicted the statements Hood made in his proffer.137 The trial
129. Id. at 425-26, 611 S.E.2d at 640-41.
130. 269 Va. 176, 608 S.E.2d 913 (2005).
131. Id. at 178, 608 S.E.2d at 914.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 178-79, 608 S.E.2d at 914.
134. Id. at 178, 608 S.E.2d at 914.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 180, 608 S.E.2d at 915.
137. Id.
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court agreed and permitted the admission of the statements made
by the defendant to the Commonwealth. 3 '
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, the court first
held that these "'cooperation/immunity' agreements .. .unlike
plea agreements, involve only the contracting parties and are not
subject to the filing and acceptance procedures applicable to plea
agreements."39 Such cooperation/immunity agreements "impli-
cate a defendant's due process rights and are generally governed
by the law of contracts." 4 ° On appeal, "the trial court's interpre-
tation of the agreement is a matter of law subject to de novo re-
view, while a clearly erroneous standard of review is applied to
the trial court's factual findings."14 Furthermore, a trial court's
finding that the defendant breached the agreement is reviewed
under the same highly deferential standard employed for review-
ing factual determinations.' In this case, the court held that the
trial court did not clearly err in its factual finding that the defen-
dant breached the agreement. 4 3 The evidence that the defendant
sought to adduce during his cross-examination of the medical ex-
aminer, which implicated someone other than Madison in the
murder, was different from the statement he provided in the prof-
fer.'4
The Court of Appeals of Virginia examined a different issue in-
volving cooperation/immunity agreements in Lampkins v. Com-
monwealth . 4 Lampkins agreed to cooperate with the police in
exchange for complete immunity from prosecution.1 46 The record
showed that the defendant followed the letter of the instructions
given to him by law enforcement, but the lead detective found
him "'tough to talk to"' and the defendant occasionally expressed
frustration and anger with police questioning. 47 The Common-
wealth informed Lampkins that he was not being truthful.'" De-
138. Id.
139. Id. at 181, 608 S.E.2d at 915.
140. Id., 608 S.E.2d at 916 (citing Lampkins v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 709, 722,
607 S.E.2d 722, 728-29 (Ct. App. 2005)).
141. Id.
142. See id. at 182, 608 S.E.2d at 916.
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. 44 Va. App. 709, 607 S.E.2d 722 (Ct. App. 2005).
146. See id. at 713, 607 S.E.2d at 724.
147. See id. at 713-14, 607 S.E.2d at 724.
148. Id. at 714, 607 S.E.2d at 724.
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spite Lampkins' objection that the Commonwealth was bound by
the cooperation/immunity agreement, he was charged with, and
convicted of, murder.14 On appeal, the court held that it was the
Commonwealth's burden to establish the defendant's breach of a
cooperation/immunity agreement and that it had not met that
burden.15 ° Furthermore, the court found that unlike plea agree-
ments, the defendant need not show any prejudice for the agree-
ment to be enforced.' 5 ' Therefore, the defendant must be given
the benefit of his agreement, which is immunity from prosecu-
tion.1
52
K. Immunity from Testimony
Virginia Code section 19.2-270 provides that "[in a criminal
prosecution, other than for perjury, . . . evidence shall not be
given against the accused of any statement made by him as a
witness upon a legal examination, in a criminal or civil action,
unless such statement was made when examined as a witness in
his own behalf."'53 The scope of the exception to this statute was
at issue in Frazier v. Commonwealth."4 Frazier's boyfriend, Am-
pazzio Warren, was tried for drug-related offenses."' He fled
while the jury was deliberating." 6 At Warren's subsequent trial
for failing to appear, Frazier testified that she had encouraged
him to leave the area.
157
She was later charged with aiding and abetting his failure to
appear. 58 Relying on Virginia Code section 19.2-270, she moved
to exclude any evidence of her prior testimony in her boyfriend's
case." 9 The trial court held the prior testimony admissible be-
cause she was testifying on her own behalf as well as for her boy-
149. See id., 607 S.E.2d at 725.
150. Id. at 722-23, 607 S.E.2d at 729.
151. See id. at 723-24, 607 S.E.2d at 729.
152. Id. at 724, 607 S.E.2d at 729.
153. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270 (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2005).
154. 268 Va. 412, 601 S.E.2d 624 (2004).
155. See id. at 414-15, 601 S.E.2d at 625.
156. See id. at 415, 601 S.E.2d at 625.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 414, 601 S.E.2d at 625.
159. Id. at 415, 601 S.E.2d at 626.
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friend.16 ° The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed, reasoning that a
witness testifies on their own behalf "when, as here, there exists
between the parties interests of a personal, familial, and financial
nature and the issue is whether the accused was testifying in her
own behalf at an earlier trial." 6' In Frazier, the court explained
that there was "no doubt that a personal and familial interest ex-
isted between Frazier and Warren. They were girlfriend and boy-
friend and she was carrying his child, both when she urged him to
flee from his drug/weapons trial and when she testified at his
trial for failure to appear."'62 In addition, the court noted that fi-
nancial interests tied Warren and Frazier.'63 Therefore, the court
held that the trial court properly permitted the Commonwealth to
adduce her prior testimony because it was in her "own behalf'
and the statutory exclusion did not apply."
L. Capital Murder Indictments
In Muhammad v. Commonwealth,'6' the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia examined whether the defendant's capital murder indict-
ments were defective for failing to allege the aggravating factors
in support of the death penalty.'66 Muhammad, relying on Ring v.
Arizona,'67 contended that the aggravating factors were "the func-
tional equivalent of elements of the offense of capital murder."'6 '
The court rejected the argument, holding that, unlike the Arizona
statute examined in Ring, "the existence of one or both aggravat-
ing factors of vileness or future dangerousness is submitted to a
jury."'69 Moreover, the court noted that the Grand Jury Clause of
the Fifth Amendment has not been incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment. 70 Therefore, Muhammad could not es-
160. Id. at 416, 601 S.E.2d at 626.
161. Id. at 417, 601 S.E.2d at 626.
162. Id., 601 S.E.2d at 626-27.
163. Id., 601 S.E.2d at 627.
164. See id. at 418, 601 S.E.2d at 627.
165. 269 Va. 451, 611 S.E.2d 537 (2005).
166. See id. at 491, 611 S.E.2d at 560.
167. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
168. Muhammad, 269 Va at 491, 611 S.E.2d at 560.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 492, 611 S.E.2d at 560-61 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 477 n.3 (2000)).
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tablish that he was deprived of any right under the federal consti-
tution.17
1
M. Statute of Limitations
In Foster v. Commonwealth,72 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
held that the circuit court correctly applied a five-year statute of
limitations for petit larceny, rather than the general one-year
statute of limitations reserved for misdemeanor offenses, such as
uttering a bad check. 173 The court reasoned that because the legis-
lature "define[s] uttering a bad check as larceny . . . [Virginia]
Code § 18.2-181 makes the misdemeanor grade of the offense a
form of larceny."1 74 As such, it should be treated as a petit larceny
subject to the five-year statute of limitations. 75
III. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. Exclusionary Rule
The Court of Appeals of Virginia addressed two important is-
sues relating to the exclusionary rule in Brown v. City of Dan-
ville.'76 In Brown, police responded to a call concerning a domestic
disturbance. 177 When they arrived, the defendant was combat-
ive.178 As police began to frisk him for weapons, he repeatedly
thrust his hands in his pockets. 79 Police told Brown that he was
under arrest."'8 A struggle ensued.' 8' Ultimately, Brown was sub-
dued and arrested.8 2 The search incident to arrest yielded co-
171. See id. at 493, 611 S.E.2d at 561.
172. 44 Va. App. 574, 606 S.E.2d 518 (Ct. App. 2004). The Supreme Court of Virginia
has granted Foster's petition for appeal. See Foster v. Commonwealth, No. 050510 (Va.
July 18, 2005).
173. See id. at 582, 606 S.E.2d at 522.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. 44 Va. App. 586, 606 S.E.2d 523 (Ct. App. 2004).
177. Id. at 592, 606 S.E.2d at 526.
178. See id.
179. Id. at 593, 606 S.E.2d at 527.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 593-94, 606 S.E.2d at 527.
182. See id. at 594, 606 S.E.2d at 527.
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caine.'83 Brown was charged with possession of cocaine and ob-
struction of justice."8
Brown filed a motion to suppress the drugs, arguing that the
officers lacked a basis to frisk him for weapons.'85 The circuit
court agreed and granted the motion to suppress.186 The court de-
clined, however, to strike the obstruction of justice charge based
on Brown's conduct after the illegal search and seizure.87 Brown
was convicted of obstructing justice. 88 At his sentencing, the
court considered, over his objection, the evidence that had been
suppressed.
89
The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed. 9 ° The court rea-
soned that while the exclusionary rule applies to oral statements,
"the testimony that is generally prohibited by this rule is deriva-
tive evidence relating to the suppressed tangible physical objects
or verbal statements."' 9' However, "[t]he exclusionary rule does
not... extend further and also prohibit testimony describing the
defendant's own illegal actions following an unlawful search or
seizure. " "' The authority for this view, the court noted, was over-
whelming.'93
Finally, the court upheld the trial court's decision to consider
the suppressed evidence in the sentencing phase of the trial.'94
The court, along with most other jurisdictions, concluded that a
court may, in its discretion, consider suppressed evidence at a
sentencing hearing.195 The court reasoned that the application of
the exclusionary rule is "'restricted to those areas where its re-
medial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.""96 The
sentencing phase is not an area where such objectives would be
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id., 606 S.E.2d at 527-28.
186. Id., 606 S.E.2d at 528.
187. See id. at 595, 606 S.E.2d at 528.
188. Id.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. Id. at 599, 606 S.E.2d at 530.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 600, 606 S.E.2d at 530.
194. See id. at 606, 606 S.E.2d at 533.
195. See id. at 609-10, 606 S.E.2d at 535-36.
196. Id. at 607, 606 S.E.2d at 534 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908
(1984)).
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served because the rule would run counter to the "'traditional ju-
dicial prerogative of sentencing an offender based upon all the
relevant and reliable information that is available."'197 Finally,
the court concluded that permitting such evidence to be consid-
ered would not likely encourage police misconduct. 9 '
B. Scope of Pat-Down Searches
In El-Amin v. Commonwealth,199 the police received an anony-
mous tip about a group of young men who were smoking mari-
juana on the street."' When they arrived at the scene, the police
did not observe any illegal activity.20 ' The officers asked to speak
with two of the individuals, whereupon one of the young men
shoved his hand into his waistband.2 2 The officer ordered this
person to face him, but he did not comply.20 3 When the young man
began to reach for his waistband, a struggle ensued.2 4 Police re-
trieved a pellet gun from the suspect's waistband.2 5 The officers
proceeded to pat-down the other members of the group.20 6 In so
doing, police recovered a handgun from the defendant.2 7 He was
then arrested.20 8 In the search incident to arrest, the police found
marijuana and cocaine in his pockets.20 9
El-Amin contended that the pat-down search was illegal.2'0 He
argued that he could not be the subject of a pat-down based on his
mere proximity to the gun-carrying youth.2" The Supreme Court
of Virginia upheld the search.212 The court reasoned that once the
197. Id. at 608, 606 S.E.2d at 534 (quoting United States v. Tauil-Hemandez, 88 F.3d
576, 581 (8th Cir. 1996)).
198. See id. at 609, 606 S.E.2d at 535.
199. 269 Va. 15, 607 S.E.2d 115 (2005).
200. Id. at 18, 607 S.E.2d at 116.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See id. at 19, 607 S.E.2d at 117.
211. See id. at 20, 607 S.E.2d at 117.
212. See id. at 22-23, 607 S.E.2d at 118-19.
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police officer learned that one of the members of the defendant's
group possessed a gun, the officer could reasonably infer that
other members of the group presented a threat.213 The court em-
phasized that companionship alone did not warrant a pat-down
search.214 Given, however, "[t]he totality of the facts in this case-
place, time, discovery of a weapon, and group activity," the pat-
down search was justified.2 5
C. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement
In Kyer v. Commonwealth,216 the Court of Appeals of Virginia,
sitting en banc, rejected application of two exceptions to the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.1 The court found that
neither the "emergency" exception nor the "community caretaker"
exception applied to the situation where the police entered a resi-
dence without a warrant, based only on observing an open door
on an August night.21" The court further held, however, that de-
spite the unlawful entry, because the police obtained permission
from the defendant's mother to search her apartment, the subse-
quent search that produced evidence of a crime committed by the
defendant was lawful.21 9 The court ruled that any taint created by
the entry was cured by the voluntary consent of the resident.
2 0
In a panel decision, the Court of Appeals of Virginia upheld ap-
plication of the "emergency" exception under a very different set
of facts. In Cherry v. Commonwealth,22' the court found that a
warrantless entry into a residence by the police was lawful based
upon the exigent circumstances surrounding the situation.222 A
police officer noticed a stolen truck in the driveway of a private
residence.223 He approached the house and knocked on the door.224
213. See id., 607 S.E.2d at 119.
214. Id. at 23, 607 S.E.2d at 119.
215. Id.
216. 45 Va. App. 473, 612 S.E.2d 213 (Ct. App. 2005) (en banc).
217. See id. at 479, 612 S.E.2d at 216.
218. Id., 481, 612 S.E.2d at 216-17.
219. See id. at 485, 612 S.E.2d at 219.
220. Id. at 476-77, 487, 612 S.E.2d at 215, 220.
221. 44 Va. App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297 (Ct. App. 2004).
222. See id. at 352, 605 S.E.2d at 299.
223. Id. at 353, 605 S.E.2d at 300.
224. Id.
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A woman opened the door and immediately notified the occupants
of the home that the police were present.225 The officer smelled
the odor of marijuana emanating from the residence and heard
people moving around inside.226 The officer entered the house
without invitation and saw drug paraphernalia.227 He arrested
the defendant and a search incident to arrest yielded additional
contraband.228 The court held that detection of the odor of mari-
juana by an officer who was familiar with its smell provided that
officer with probable cause to believe that there was marijuana
inside the house.229
Further, the court found that exigent circumstances justified
the warrantless entry.23 ° The officer had arrived at the door to in-
vestigate an unrelated crime.23' When the woman opened the
door, the officer saw a bed sheet hung inside the house in a man-
ner that obscured anyone from seeing inside.232 He also smelled
"the unmistakable odor of burning marijuana."33 When she saw
him, the woman alerted those inside that the police were present
and the officer then heard people moving around inside.234 Based
upon all of these facts, the court concluded that the officer acted
reasonably in concluding that the drugs and occupants were
likely to be gone by the time he obtained a warrant. 235 Thus, the
court held that his warrantless entry was lawful.236
D. Expectation of Privacy
In a case involving the warrantless entry of police into a motel
room, the Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the defendant
failed to prove that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the room and, consequently, he did not have a basis to challenge
225. Id.
226. Id. at 353-54, 605 S.E.2d at 300.
227. See id. at 354, 605 S.E.2d at 300.
228. See id.
229. Id. at 357-58, 605 S.E.2d at 302.
230. See id. at 367, 605 S.E.2d at 307.
231. Id. at 362, 605 S.E.2d at 304.
232. Id. at 363, 605 S.E.2d at 304.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id., 605 S.E.2d at 305.
236. See id. at 367, 605 S.E.2d at 307.
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the entry.237 The officers went to the motel room to engage in a
"'knock and talk' to determine whether the occupants were en-
gaged in illegal narcotics activities.238 Prior to approaching the
room, the detectives checked the motel registration informa-
tion.239 They knocked on the door to the room, announced their
presence, and engaged in an initial encounter with a third-party
occupant who was not the registered guest and did not have a key
to the room.24 ° The officers subsequently entered the room using a
pass key.241 The defendant was inside, sleeping in a bed.242
The court noted that whether the privacy interest afforded
overnight guests extends to overnight guests of motel registrants
is a matter of first impression in Virginia and has not been ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court of the United States.243 However,
the court found that a defendant claiming such a privacy interest
must demonstrate that he is an invited guest of the renter or reg-
istered guest.2" Here, beyond the defendant's mere presence in
the room, there was absolutely no evidence that the defendant
was present with the registrant's consent.245 Neither the defen-
dant nor the other occupant had a key to the room, nor were they
registered as guests in the room.246 Further, neither party
claimed any connection to the motel guest.247 Thus, the defendant
failed to prove that he was an overnight guest of the renter and
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the room.248
E. Warrants
In Anzualda v. Commonwealth,249 the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia, sitting en banc, found that although a search warrant ap-
237. Sharpe v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 448, 455, 605 S.E.2d 346, 349 (Ct. App.
2004).
238. Id. at 450-51, 605 S.E.2d at 347.
239. Id. at 451, 605 S.E.2d at 347.
240. Id., 605 S.E.2d at 347-48.
241. See id., 605 S.E.2d at 348.
242. See id. at 452, 605 S.E.2d at 348.
243. Id. at 456, 605 S.E.2d at 350.
244. Id. (quoting United States v. Conway, 73 F.3d 975, 979 (10th Cir. 1995)).
245. Id. at 457, 605 S.E.2d at 350.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See id. at 457-58, 605 S.E.2d at 351.
249. 44 Va. App. 764, 607 S.E.2d 749 (Ct. App. 2005) (en banc).
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peared to be stale, the evidence was properly admitted at trial
based on application of the "good faith exception" to the warrant
requirement.25 ° The court opined that the warrant was "not so
lacking in indicia of probable cause" as to render it such that no
reasonable officer would have relied upon it. 25' The court noted
that the affidavit in support of the warrant did not have facts to
enable the magistrate to infer that the defendant still had the
murder weapon and that he was keeping it in the target resi-
dence.2 52 In any event, the majority found that the good faith ex-
ception to the exclusionary rule applied.25 The court held that the
record supported the conclusion that the officer acted in good
faith and reasonably believed that the warrant was valid.25 4 It
added that clearly there were some indicia of probable cause and
the document was not "'bare-bones."'255 The court concluded that
"[b]ecause the officer possessed an objectively reasonable belief in
the existence of probable cause[,] . . . the trial court did not err in
admitting the seized evidence under the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule."256
IV. EVIDENCE
A. Photographic Lineups
In Winston v. Commonwealth,257 the Supreme Court of Virginia
made clear that the defendant bears the burden to show that an
out-of-court identification is unduly suggestive so as to taint any
in-court identifications. The court recognized that the Supreme
Court of the United States "established a two part analysis for
determining whether an in-court identification should be ex-
cluded" based upon "an improper method for obtaining an out-of-
court identification."259 Relying upon a decision of the United
250. See id. at 770-71, 607 S.E.2d at 752.
251. Id. at 786, 607 S.E.2d at 760.
252. Id. at 777, 607 S.E.2d at 755.
253. See id. at 788, 607 S.E.2d at 761.
254. Id. at 780, 607 S.E.2d at 757.
255. Id. at 781-82, 607 S.E.2d at 758.
256. Id. at 788, 607 S.E.2d at 761.
257. 268 Va. 564, 604 S.E.2d 21 (2004).
258. See id. at 593-94, 604 S.E.2d at 38.
259. Id. at 593, 604 S.E.2d at 37.
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States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,26 ° the court held
that it is the defendant's burden to prove that the "'photographic
lineup procedure was impermissibly suggestive.' 261
B. Testimonial and Documentary Evidence of a Third Party's
Mental State
In an unusual case, the Court of Appeals of Virginia was asked
to consider whether a criminal defendant was entitled to the
mental health records of a third party and related witness testi-
mony in a situation where the third party had been subject to a
court-ordered mental health evaluation pursuant to Virginia
Code section 19.2-169.5.262 The court found that, despite the fact
that the defendant was on trial for conspiracy to commit murder
and the third party was charged with actually having committed
the murder, the defendant was not entitled to materials produced
during the course of the third party's mental health evaluation or
the related testimony of the doctor who conducted the evalua-
tion.263 Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
found that all notes relating to the statutory mental health
evaluation were protected and the doctor's testimony was inad-
missible .264
V. JURIES
In Riner v. Commonwealth,265 the defendant asserted that the
trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial based on a
claim of "'unauthorized third party contact' by a juror.266 In this
case, a juror had unauthorized contact with his wife relating to
newspaper headlines about the case.267 That juror then attempted
to communicate such information to other members of the jury.268
The Supreme Court of Virginia found that the communication or
260. United States v. Wilkerson, 84 F.3d 692 (4th Cir. 1996).
261. 268 Va. at 593-94, 604 S.E.2d at 37-38 (quoting Wilkerson, 84 F.3d at 695).
262. Schwartz v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 407, 611 S.E.2d 631 (Ct. App. 2005).
263. See id. at 448-54, 611 S.E.2d at 651-55.
264. See id. at 454, 611 S.E.2d at 655.
265. 268 Va. 296, 601 S.E.2d 555 (2004).
266. Id. at 317, 601 S.E.2d at 567.
267. Id. at 314-15, 601 S.E.2d at 565.
268. Id. at 313, 601 S.E.2d at 564-65.
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attempted communication of the headlines to other jurors was
analogous to the jurors reading or hearing about the case through
the media reports.269 The court conducted an analysis of the ac-
tions taken by the trial court, which included: (1) dismissing the
offending juror from the case prior to any deliberations; (2) de-
termining that only one juror heard or remembered hearing the
offending juror discuss the newspaper article; and (3) questioning
of the jurors, which revealed that they were not influenced by the
offending juror and "actually attempted to avoid him."27" After re-
leasing the offending juror, the trial court also instructed the jury
to disregard anything the juror might have told them, pointing
out that some of his comments were actually incorrect.271 Based
upon all of the actions taken by the trial court, the court con-
cluded that the motion for a mistrial was properly denied.272
VI. SPECIFIC CRIMES
A. Assault and Battery
Over the past few years, the precise contours of Virginia's law
of assault remained unclear.273 In Carter v. Commonwealth,274 the
Supreme Court of Virginia addressed the issue. In Carter, a police
officer made a traffic stop at night and approached the driver.275
The officer noticed that the defendant, who was the passenger in
the car, had his right hand concealed by his right leg.276 The de-
fendant suddenly raised it, with his fingers formed in the fashion
of a gun, and said "'Pow.' 277 The officer experienced a brief mo-
269. Id. at 315, 601 S.E.2d at 565.
270. Id. at 316-17, 601 S.E.2d at 566.
271. Id. at 317, 601 S.E.2d at 566-67.
272. Id., 601 S.E.2d at 567.
273. In Epps v. Commonwealth, a panel of the Court of Appeals of Virginia concluded
that the common law tort definition of assault had "been incorporated into the definition of
the crime of assault." 28 Va. App. 58, 62, 502 S.E.2d 140, 142 (Ct. App. 1998). The opinion,
however, was later withdrawn and the conviction affirmed by an evenly divided court. See
Epps v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 169, 170, 510 S.E.2d 279, 279 (Ct. App. 1999) (en
banc).
274. 269 Va. 44, 606 S.E.2d 839 (2005).
275. Id. at 45, 606 S.E.2d at 840.
276. See id. at 45-46, 606 S.E.2d at 840.
277. Id. at 46, 606 S.E.2d at 840.
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ment of terror before he realized he was not in danger."' Carter
was convicted of assault on a police officer.279 He argued that his
conviction was improper because he lacked the actual ability to
inflict bodily harm.28 0 The court disagreed, holding that
a common law assault, whether a crime or tort, occurs when an as-
sailant engages in an overt act intended to inflict bodily harm and
has the present ability to inflict such harm or engages in an overt act
intended to place the victim in fear or apprehension of bodily harm
and creates such reasonable fear or apprehension in the victim.
2 8 1
To the extent there were any doubters, the Court of Appeals of
Virginia confirmed in Gilbert v. Commonwealth212 that spitting on
someone, in this case a police officer, constituted a battery.2 3
B. Burglary
In Hitt v. Commonwealth,28 4 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
further defined the term "dwelling house" for purposes of the of-
fense of statutory burglary.285 In this case, the defendant was
charged with burglary under Virginia Code section 18.2-91, based
upon his actions of breaking a lock on a bedroom door in a house
in which he was a guest.2 6 The defendant broke the lock, entered
the bedroom, and took cash that was on top of a dresser in the
room.287 The court found that the Commonwealth failed to prove
that the defendant unlawfully broke into and entered a "dwelling
house" as required by Virginia Code sections 18.2-90 and 18.2-
91.288 A locked bedroom within a home simply is not a separate
"dwelling house" under the statute.289 Consequently, the convic-
tion was reversed.29 °
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 45, 606 S.E.2d at 840.
281. Id. at 47, 606 S.E.2d at 841.
282. 45 Va. App. 67, 608 S.E.2d 509 (Ct. App. 2005).
283. See id. at 71-72, 608 S.E.2d at 511.
284. 43 Va. App. 473, 598 S.E.2d 783 (Ct. App. 2004).
285. See id. at 481-82, 598 S.E.2d at 787.
286. See id. at 477, 598 S.E.2d at 784-85.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 479-83, 598 S.E.2d at 785-88.
289. See id. at 483, 598 S.E.2d at 788.
290. Id.
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C. Capital Murder
The Supreme Court of Virginia addressed the meaning of the
"'triggerman'" concept in Muhammad v. Commonwealth.29' In
Muhammad, the defendant asserted that he could not be con-
victed of capital murder because he was not the "'triggerman."'2 92
The court rejected this argument. The court first noted that the
"'triggerman' euphemism "is inadequate to describe the breadth
of criminal responsibility subject to the death penalty in Vir-
ginia."29' For this reason, the court has employed "the term 'im-
mediate perpetrator' as the appropriate descriptive term."294 The
court held that "[iit is the actual participation together in a uni-
fied act that permits two or more persons to be immediate perpe-
trators."295
In this case, an expert testified for the prosecution about sniper
methodology and the distinct responsibilities of each member of
the sniper team, including the shooter and the spotter.296 The
court held that "[t]he Commonwealth presented compelling evi-
dence" that the defendant and his accomplice "acted together as a
sniper team."297 Therefore, the court concluded that the trial court
did not err in instructing the jury regarding the defendant's
criminal responsibility as a principal in the first degree who was
eligible for the death penalty.298
D. Driving Under the Influence
Virginia law requires that, following a test to determine the al-
cohol content of a driver's breath, "[a] copy of the certificate [of
analysis] shall be promptly delivered to the accused."299 In Shel-
ton v. Commonwealth, °° the police officer who administered the
breath test showed the defendant the results of the test but did
291. 269 Va. 451, 611 S.E.2d 537 (2005).
292. Id. at 481, 611 S.E.2d at 554.
293. Id. at 483, 611 S.E.2d at 555.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 484, 611 S.E.2d at 556.
296. Id. at 480-81, 611 S.E.2d at 553-54.
297. Id. at 481, 611 S.E.2d at 554.
298. See id. at 485, 611 S.E.2d at 557.
299. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-268.9 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
300. 45 Va. App. 175, 609 S.E.2d 89 (Ct. App. 2005).
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not provide him with a copy.30 1 At trial and on appeal, Shelton as-
serted that this failure was "fatal to its admission as evidence."3"2
The Court of Appeals of Virginia rejected this contention, holding
that the law requires only substantial compliance with the proce-
dural requirements relating to blood and breath samples and that
the officer had substantially complied.0 3 The failure to provide
the defendant with an actual copy of the results was "minor" and
"trivial" and did not prejudice the defendant in any way.30 4
In Henry v. Commonwealth, °5 the defendant sought to sup-
press the results of his breath test on the basis that the testing
equipment was not stored in compliance with applicable regula-
tions.30 6 Regulations require that the equipment be stored in "a
clean, dry location that is only accessible to an authorized licen-
see."30 7 The evidence showed that the machine was housed in the
hallway of a secure area which "could not be entered without a
jailor allowing the access."30 ' The machine was stored "between
the entrance to the jailor's office and another sheriffs office" that
was used by other employees of the sheriffs office and visitors.30 9
The equipment "was not in a partitioned space" and shared an
electrical outlet with a photocopier.310 The trial court denied the
suppression motion and the Court of Appeals of Virginia af-
firmed. 1' The court held that the evidence showed substantial
compliance and "in the absence of a showing of prejudice by the
appellant, substantial compliance is sufficient for the admission
of the test results."312 The court held that the defendant could
show no prejudice because "the machine has a self-correcting
mechanism that informs the test administrator when it cannot
provide an accurate result. The machine gave no such warning in
this case."313 Finally, the court observed that there was "no alle-
301. Id. at 177, 609 S.E.2d at 90.
302. Id. at 178, 609 S.E.2d at 90.
303. See id. at 178-81, 609 S.E.2d at 91-92.
304. See id. at 181, 609 S.E.2d at 92.
305. 44 Va. App. 702,607 S.E.2d 140 (Ct. App. 2005).
306. Id. at 705, 607 S.E.2d at 141.
307. 6 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-190-40 (2003).
308. Henry, 44 Va. App. at 705, 607 S.E.2d at 141.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 705, 708, 607 S.E.2d at 141, 143.
312. Id. at 708, 607 S.E.2d at 142.
313. Id., 607 S.E.2d at 143.
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gation that the machine was tampered with or that the results
were incorrect."314
In Wilson v. Commonwealth,"5 as noted above, Deputy Reed
Partlow, an off-duty officer from Culpeper County, observed the
defendant driving erratically." 6 When the defendant stopped his
car at a gas station in Spotsylvania County, Partlow contacted
the local police. 3 v The Spotsylvania County deputy did not think
he could arrest the defendant for driving under the influence be-
cause he had not seen him drive.3 8 Following field sobriety tests,
Wilson was arrested for being drunk in public.3 9 The following
morning, Partlow contacted the magistrate and, upon learning
there was no obstacle to obtaining a warrant charging Wilson
with driving under the influence, drove back to Spotsylvania
County and swore out a criminal complaint.32 ° About twelve hours
after he was initially arrested, the driving under the influence
warrant was served on the defendant.321
Wilson contended at trial that "his due process rights were vio-
lated because the implied consent law required the Common-
wealth to procure or permit him to obtain blood or breath testing
to determine his level of intoxication."322 The Court of Appeals of
Virginia disagreed.323 The court first noted that the implied con-
sent statute, Virginia Code section 18.2-268.2, by its plain lan-
guage, applies only to arrests for certain driving violations.324
This defendant was arrested for being drunk in public.325 When
the arrest did occur, it was not within the three hours provided
"to bring the implied consent and testing provisions of Code §
18.2-268.2 into play."326
314. Id.
315. 45 Va. App. 193, 609 S.E.2d 612 (Ct. App. 2005).
316. See id. at 196, 609 S.E.2d at 613.
317. See id. at 197, 609 S.E.2d at 614.
318. Id. at 200, 609 S.E.2d at 615.
319. Id.
320. See id. at 200-01, 609 S.E.2d at 615.
321. Id. at 207, 609 S.E.2d at 619.
322. Id. at 206-07, 609 S.E.2d at 618.
323. See id. at 207, 609 S.E.2d at 618.
324. Id., 609 S.E.2d at 619 (analyzing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-268.2 (Cum. Supp. 2005)).
325. See id.
326. Id.
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E. Driving on a Suspended License
The defendant argued in Shreve v. Commonwealth327 that she
could not be convicted for driving without a valid driver's license
because, even though her license was suspended, it was still
"valid."32 The applicable statute provides that "[nlo person ...
shall drive any motor vehicle on any highway in the Common-
wealth until such person has applied for a driver's license, as pro-
vided in this article, satisfactorily passed the examination re-
quired by § 46.2-325, and obtained a driver's license, nor unless
the license is valid. ,
329
The defendant argued that her suspended license was valid be-
cause she had obtained her license following her application for it
and that she had passed the required examination.33' The Court
of Appeals of Virginia rejected this argument, concluding that the
statute recognized two distinct violations: "(1) driving after failing
to apply for a driver's license, satisfactorily pass the examination,
and obtain the license and (2) driving without a valid license."331
Further, the court held that a suspended license is not "valid" be-
cause a suspended license is not "legally sufficient to meet its in-
tended purpose, namely, authorizing the operator of the motor
vehicle to drive on the highways of Virginia."332
F. Escape
The Court of Appeals of Virginia examined what constitutes
"custody" for purposes of escaping from custody. In Davis v.
Commonwealth,333 the defendant pled guilty to several misde-
meanor and felony charges. 334 He was allowed to remain on bond
while awaiting sentencing but was ordered to report to the re-
gional jail before his sentencing date.335 When he failed to report,
327. 44 Va. App. 541, 605 S.E.2d 780 (Ct. App. 2004).
328. Id. at 544, 605 S.E.2d at 781.
329. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-300 (Repl. Vol. 2005) (emphasis added).
330. See Shreve, 44 Va. App. at 545, 605 S.E.2d at 782.
331. Id. at 547-48, 605 S.E.2d at 783.
332. Id. at 549, 605 S.E.2d at 783-84.
333. 45 Va. App. 12, 608 S.E.2d 482 (Ct. App. 2005).
334. Id. at 13, 608 S.E.2d at 483.
335. Id.
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he was charged with escape from court custody under Virginia
Code section 18.2-479(B).336 The court agreed with the defendant
that he was not in the custody of the court and dismissed the
charge.337 After examining other cases addressing the meaning of
the term custody, the court held that "'the General Assembly
must have intended that the term 'custody' would include a de-
gree of physical control or restraint under circumstances other
than those also necessary to constitute an actual custodial ar-
rest.' 33 When the defendant failed to report to the jail, "he was
no longer in the physical custody or even presence of the court."
339
G. Firearms
In Morris v. Commonwealth,34 ° the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that a flare gun is a "firearm" for purposes of the offense of
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, proscribed by Vir-
ginia Code section 18.2-308.2."4' The Commonwealth proved that
the flare gun was "an instrument that was designed, made, and
intended to expel a projectile by means of an explosion."342
In another case, the Court of Appeals of Virginia considered a
variety of double jeopardy challenges to firearms offenses based
upon the claim that they were lesser-included offenses.343 The
court found that: (1) brandishing a firearm is not a lesser-
included offense of robbery; (2) "possession of a firearm by a felon
is not a lesser-included offense of brandishing a firearm;" and (3)
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is not a lesser-
included offense of carrying a concealed weapon. 344 Thus, the
court concluded that because the defendant had not been pun-
ished twice for the same offense, nor had he been punished for a
crime that is a lesser offense of another, his multiple convictions
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 15, 608 S.E.2d at 484 (quoting White v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 96, 104,
591 S.E.2d 662, 667 (2004)) (emphasis added).
339. Id.
340. 269 Va. 127, 607 S.E.2d 110 (2005).
341. See id. at 131, 607 S.E.2d at 112 (citing Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 263 Va.
573, 584, 562 S.E.2d 139, 145 (2002)).
342. Id. at 132, 607 S.E.2d at 113.
343. Morris v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 181, 609 S.E.2d 92 (Ct. App. 2005).
344. See id. at 189-90, 609 S.E.2d at 96.
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did not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeop-
ardy.345
In Powell v. Commonwealth,346 the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed the defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm in
the commission of a felony, in violation of Virginia Code section
18.2-53.1. 341 The court opined that despite the fact that the Com-
monwealth was required to prove that the defendant "possessed"
a firearm, the trier of fact was entitled to resolve the conflicts in
the evidence.348 Although no gun was found, the defendant's
statements and actions during the commission of the crimes sug-
gested that he had a gun.349 The court noted that the trier of fact
determined that the defendant had a gun and that conclusion was
supported by facts in the record.35° The evidence that he pos-
sessed a gun included the defendant's representations to the vic-
tims that he had a gun and would hurt them, as well as his ac-
tions of keeping his hand in his pocket and being fidgety.35' The
court found that the conclusion that the defendant had a gun was
entirely supported by the record.352
H. Indecent Liberties
In Viney v. Commonwealth,"3 the defendant "was convicted of
two counts of taking indecent liberties with a child in violation of
Code § 18.2-370.""' 4 The defendant contended on appeal that the
Commonwealth failed to prove that he acted with "lascivious in-
tent" when he exposed his penis to two young girls.3 55 The Su-
preme Court of Virginia rejected his argument.3 6 The court found
that when the defendant "made eye contact with the girls and
then directed their attention to his groin area by intentionally
345. Id.
346. 268 Va. 233, 602 S.E.2d 119 (2004).
347. See id. at 235-37, 602 S.E.2d at 120-21.
348. Id. at 237, 602 S.E.2d at 121.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. See id.
353. 269 Va. 296, 609 S.E.2d 26 (2005).
354. Id. at 298, 609 S.E.2d at 27.
355. Id.
356. See id. at 302, 609 S.E.2d at 29-30.
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glancing down," followed by his intentional act of pulling his
shorts aside in order to expose his penis to the girls, his acts con-
stituted a gesture made with lascivious intent.8 7
I. Malicious Wounding by a Mob
In Hughes v. Commonwealth,358 the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia concluded that three brothers who assembled and decided to
"crash" a party were properly convicted of malicious wounding by
a mob and assault and battery by a mob based upon actions
which occurred at the party.359 The court found that the evidence
supported the conclusion that the three defendants acted as
members of a mob.36 ° Specifically, the court found that:
Appellants arrived at the party together, uninvited and armed.
When asked to leave, they became angry and aggressive. Systemati-
cally, they attacked a number of the party's hosts and guests. Each
brother assisted the other brothers in the attacks. Each brother
fought off people who were trying to assist the victims. Appellants,
agitated when asked to leave the party, collectively attacked a num-
ber of victims and did not act as independent aggressors. The jury
properly found, based on this evidence[,] that appellants acted as a
mob.36 '
J. Perjury
A prerequisite for a perjury conviction under Virginia Code sec-
tion 18.2-434 is that the testimony must be "material."362 The
Court of Appeals of Virginia explained the meaning of materiality
in Fritter v. Commonwealth.3' Fritter, a suspect in a homicide in-
vestigation, told the police he had received a letter from another
suspect, Nick Halteh.6 4 In the letter, Halteh indicated that he
wanted the complaining witness paid off or "[dlelt [sic] with some-
357. See id. at 301-02, 609 S.E.2d at 29.
358. 43 Va. App. 391, 598 S.E.2d 743 (Ct. App. 2004).
359. See id. at 395, 598 S.E.2d at 744-45.
360. Id. at 399, 598 S.E.2d at 747.
361. Id. at 402, 598 S.E.2d at 748.
362. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-434 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
363. 45 Va. App. 345, 610 S.E.2d 887 (Ct. App. 2005).
364. Id. at 348-49, 610 S.E.2d at 888-89.
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how."365 When called as a witness in Halteh's trial, Fritter denied
he had ever received the letter.366 The Commonwealth was never-
theless able to authenticate the letter by other means. 367 Halteh
was ultimately acquitted. 36" The Commonwealth then charged
Fritter with perjury.369 Fritter asserted, inter alia, that his testi-
mony was not material and, therefore, his conviction could not
stand.37°
The court concluded that "'[tiestimony is material if it is rele-
vant to a main or collateral issue on trial .... Evidence is rele-
vant if it has any logical tendency, however slight, to establish a
fact at issue in the case.' 371 The ultimate issue in Halteh's case,
the court noted, "was whether Halteh was the criminal actor. Any
evidence that tended to prove or disprove Halteh's guilt was rele-
vant .... "372 The letter from Halteh, which sought to suppress or
bribe testimony against him, "was inculpatory because it tended
to show a consciousness of guilt."37 3 Fritter's testimony regarding
the letter's authenticity was therefore relevant and material.374
K. Terrorism
The Supreme Court of Virginia sustained Virginia's terrorism
predicate for capital murder against a number of constitutional
challenges in Muhammad v. Commonwealth.37' The defendant
contended that the statutes, Virginia Code sections 18.2-31(13)
and 18.2-46.4, were unconstitutionally vague.376 The court held
that the terms employed by the statute provided sufficient notice
"for ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits."377
365. See id. at 349, 610 S.E.2d at 889.
366. Id. at 350, 610 S.E.2d at 889.
367. See id.
368. Id. at 351, 610 S.E.2d at 890.
369. See id.
370. See id.
371. Id. at 352, 610 S.E.2d at 890 (quoting Ragland v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 913,
918, 434 S.E.2d 675, 678 (Ct. App. 1993); Sheard v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 227, 232,
403 S.E.2d 178, 180 (Ct. App. 1991)).
372. Id.
373. Id. at 353, 610 S.E.2d at 890.
374. Id., 610 S.E.2d at 891.
375. 269 Va. 451, 611 S.E.2d 537 (2005).
376. Id. at 496, 611 S.E.2d at 563.
377. See id. at 497-500, 611 S.E.2d at 563-65.
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Furthermore, Muhammad's argument centered on hypothetical
situations rather than his own conduct. 7 8 However, a defendant
"who engages in conduct that is clearly proscribed and not consti-
tutionally protected may not successfully attack a statute as void
for vagueness based upon [the] hypothetical conduct of others. 379
L. Unauthorized Use
In Tucker v. Commonwealth,38 ° the Supreme Court of Virginia
examined whether a defendant can be convicted for unauthorized
use when he initially obtains the vehicle with the consent of the
owner."' According to Tucker, he borrowed a car from an ac-
quaintance to travel to a restaurant and a convenience store.38 2
The owner of the car saw Tucker later and demanded that he re-
turn the car.383 Tucker said he would return it, but did not.3s'
Several days later, when the car's owner approached the defen-
dant-who was still driving the borrowed car-the defendant
sped away.38 5 The damaged car was found several days later.38 6
Tucker argued that he could not be convicted of unauthorized use
because the taking was not initially "trespassory. "387 The Su-
preme Court of Virginia disagreed, holding that the plain lan-
guage of Virginia Code section 18.2-102 criminalized a taking
"'without the consent of the owner.' 388 The court concluded that:
When an owner consents to another person having temporary pos-
session of the owner's vehicle, but does not consent to its use beyond
a designated period of possession, the statute is violated when such
use continues without the owner's consent and is accompanied by an
intent to temporarily deprive the owner of possession of the vehi-
cle.
38 9
378. Id. at 500, 611 S.E.2d at 565.
379. Id. at 501, 611 S.E.2d at 565-66.
380. 268 Va. 490, 604 S.E.2d 66 (2004).
381. See id. at 492, 604 S.E.2d at 67.
382. See id.
383. See id.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 493, 611 S.E.2d at 67.
388. Id. at 493-94, 604 S.E.2d at 67-68 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-102 (Repl. Vol.
2004)).
389. Id. at 494, 604 S.E.2d at 68. The Court of Appeals of Virginia had reached the
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VII. POST-TRIAL/REVOCATION
In Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 0' the defendant was convicted
of grand larceny.39' Although an order was prepared, it was not
signed or entered by the court.392 The defendant served some time
in prison and was released on probation.393 After he was convicted
of new offenses, the court held a revocation proceeding.39 a The de-
fendant contended that he could not be convicted of violating an
order that had never been signed or entered.39 5 The trial court
disagreed, and before revoking his suspended sentence, signed
and entered the order nunc pro tunc. 9 s
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed.39 First, the court held
that there was no issue regarding the correctness of the sentenc-
ing order entered nunc pro tunc.39s Second, the court held that:
The rendition of a judgment must be distinguished from its entry on
the court records. The rendition of a judgment duly pronounced is
the judicial act of the court, and the entry or recording of the in-
strument memorializing the judgment "does not constitute an inte-
gral part of, and should not be confused with, the judgment itself."399
Therefore, the court held, "[t]he absence of the judge's signature
'does not invalidate the judgment rendered.' 4 °°
In Peyton v. Commonwealth,4"' the defendant was convicted of
possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute.4 2 After he was
found suitable for participation in the Detention Center Incar-
ceration Program, "the trial court suspended the balance of [his]
sentence and placed him on probation conditioned upon his entry
same result earlier in Overstreet v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 234, 238, 435 S.E.2d 906,
909 (Ct. App. 1993).
390. 269 Va. 136, 607 S.E.2d 107 (2005).
391. Id. at 138, 607 S.E.2d at 108.
392. Id.
393. Id., 607 S.E.2d at 109.
394. Id.
395. See id.
396. Id.
397. Id., 607 S.E.2d at 108.
398. See id. at 139, 607 S.E.2d at 109.
399. Id. (quoting Rollins v. Bazile, 205 Va. 613, 617, 139 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1964)).
400. Id. (quoting Rollins, 205 Va. at 617-18, 139 S.E.2d at 118).
401. 268 Va. 503, 604 S.E.2d 17 (2004).
402. Id. at 506, 604 S.E.2d at 18.
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into and successful completion of the program."4 °3 Peyton was un-
able to complete the program due to "'medical/psychological' rea-
sons.40 4 The trial court then proceeded to revoke the entire sus-
pended sentence, deeming that because the defendant had not
completed the program, it was required to revoke the suspended
sentence.40 5 The defendant argued that the trial court abused its
discretion in revoking his suspended sentence because his dis-
charge from the detention center was not attributable to willful
conduct on his part.40 6 The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed.40 7
The court reiterated that trial courts are vested with discretion in
determining whether to revoke all or part of a defendant's sen-
tence.408 However, where the defendant's removal from the deten-
tion program is not the result of his behavior or conduct, the trial
court must at least consider reasonable alternatives to imprison-
ment.40 9 The court's failure to do so was an abuse of discretion.410
VIII. SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR LAW
The Supreme Court of Virginia, in Shivaee v. Common-
wealth,41' brushed aside a constitutional challenge to the law au-
thorizing the commitment of certain sexual predators. 4 2 The
court examined Virginia's statute against the statutes recently
upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in Kansas v.
Crane413 and Kansas v. Hendricks.4 The court concluded that
Virginia's statute contains the required procedures and eviden-
tiary safeguards as well as the requirement of a finding of dan-
gerousness to one's self or others.415 The clear and convincing
standard of proof found in the Virginia law satisfies due proc-
403. Id.
404. Id. at 506-07, 604 S.E.2d at 18.
405. Id. at 507, 604 S.E.2d at 18.
406. Id., 604 S.E.2d at 19.
407. See id. at 511, 604 S.E.2d at 21.
408. Id. at 508, 604 S.E.2d at 19 (citing Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 325, 326,
228 S.E.2d 555, 556 (1976)).
409. Id. at 511, 604 S.E.2d at 21.
410. Id.
411. 270 Va. 112, 613 S.E.2d 570 (2005).
412. See id. at 123-26, 613 S.E.2d at 576-78.
413. 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
414. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
415. Shivaee, 270 Va. at 123, 613 S.E.2d at 576.
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ess.416 The court further held that the Virginia law properly links
the condition of the person with proof of dangerousness and lack
of control.417 The court also held that the law is not void for
vagueness.4"' Finally, consistent with the jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court of the United States, the court concluded that the
Virginia law does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause or the
Ex Post Facto Clause.419
IX. LEGISLATION
A. Speedy Trial-Double Jeopardy
Defendants raising constitutional speedy trial or double jeop-
ardy objections to a prosecution must now file their objections in
writing seven days before trial or "at such time prior to trial as
the grounds for the motion or objection shall arise, whichever oc-
curs last."420 The new law omits any mention of statutory rights.
In addition, if a court dismisses a prosecution on such grounds,
the Commonwealth now has a right to appeal.42'
B. Driving Offenses
Filling a lacuna in the law, a defendant whose driver's license
has been suspended following a conviction for certain reckless
driving offenses can now be issued a restricted license by a
court.
4 2 2
Virginia has long recognized a "presumption" that a defendant
is driving under the influence of alcohol if his blood or breath con-
tains a certain level of alcohol.4 23 The General Assembly estab-
lished a similar scheme with respect to certain illegal drugs,
which provides that persons driving with the specified level of
416. Id. at 126, 613 S.E.2d at 578.
417. Id. at 123, 613 S.E.2d at 576.
418. Id. at 124-25, 613 S.E.2d at 577.
419. Id. at 125, 613 S.E.2d at 577.
420. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-266.2 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
421. See id. § 19.2-398 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
422. Id. § 46.2-393 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
423. See id. § 18.2-269(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2005).
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drugs will henceforth be "presumed" to be driving under the in-
fluence of the drug.424
C. Drugs
Given the growing problems associated with methampheta-
mine consumption and production, the General Assembly enacted
a statute that targets methamphetamine manufacturers. The
new law punishes the possession of two or more "precursor" sub-
stances with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, meth-
cathinone or amphetamine. 425 The General Assembly also in-
creased the penalties for methamphetamine manufacture. 426 The
penalties rise for subsequent offenses.427 Finally, a person who
maintains a custodial relationship over a child and permits the
child to be present in a building or structure during the manufac-
ture of methamphetamine now faces a felony conviction with a
sentencing range of ten to forty years in prison.42
D. Escape
Previously, Virginia law punished the escape of a person in
custody on a charge or conviction of a misdemeanor 42 or the es-
cape with force or violence of a person in custody for a criminal
offense.430 However, it did not cover persons who were in custody
for probation or parole violations and who had escaped without
the use of force. The General Assembly has now provided a stat-
ute covering that situation.431
424. Act of Mar. 23, 2005, ch. 616, 2005 Va. Acts 818 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 18.2-266, -269 (Cum. Supp. 2005)).
425. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-248(J) (Cum. Supp. 2005).
426. See Act of Apr. 6, 2005, ch. 923, 2005 Va. Acts 1706 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-248 (Cum. Supp. 2005)).
427. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-248(C1) (Cum. Supp. 2005).
428. Id. § 18.2-248.02 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
429. Id. § 18.2-479 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
430. Id. § 18.2-478 (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2005).
431. Act of Mar. 22, 2005, ch. 573, 2005 Va. Acts 761 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-479 (Cum. Supp. 2005)).
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E. Evidence-Marital Privilege
The General Assembly has expanded the scope of the privilege
protecting confidential marital communications. The new statute
provides that a defendant can refuse to disclose, as well as pre-
vent anyone else from disclosing, any confidential communication
between himself and his spouse.432 This privilege applies "regard-
less of whether he is married to that spouse at the time he objects
to disclosure."433 A "confidential communication" is defined as "a
communication made privately by a person to his spouse that is
not intended for disclosure to any other person."434
F. Gangs
Building on its existing legislation, the General Assembly en-
acted a statute that provides for enhanced punishment for speci-
fied gang crimes that take place within a school zone. 435 The list
of predicate crimes that the prosecution must show to prove the
existence of a criminal street gang was also expanded to include
crimes that are similar to those currently listed under the laws of
other states or the United States. 436 Finally, the venerable civil
nuisance statute was amended to include an area used for the ac-
tivities of a criminal street gang.437 A nuisance lawsuit against
the gang can be brought in the same manner as a suit against an
unincorporated association.438
G. Insanity-Expert Reports
In cases where a defendant obtains his own expert to evaluate
his sanity, the expert must now prepare a written report.439 The
report, along with certain other medical records obtained in the
process of evaluation, must be disclosed to the prosecution in fel-
ony cases.44 °
432. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-271.2 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Act of Mar. 26, 2005, ch. 813, 2005 Va. Acts 1347 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-46.3:3 (Cum. Supp. 2005)).
436. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-46.1 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
437. See id. § 48-8 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
438. Id.
439. See id. § 19.2-169.5(F) (Cum. Supp. 2005).
440. See id. § 19.2-169.5(E) (Cum. Supp. 2005).
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H. Juvenile Possession of Alcohol
The General Assembly prohibited the consumption as well as
the possession of alcohol by persons under the age of twenty-
one.44' Furthermore, anyone who provides or assists in the provi-
sion of alcohol to persons under twenty-one, subject to certain ex-
ceptions, is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.442
I. Perjury
Virginia Code section 8.01-4.3 was amended to allow unsworn
statements in certain cases, provided the declarant states under
penalty of perjury that the statement is correct.' The perjury
statute was therefore amended to permit a prosecution for one
who willfully subscribes as true an unsworn statement made in
the form permitted by Virginia Code section 8.01-4.3.
J. Photographic Lineups
The state police and local law enforcement are now required to
"establish a written policy and procedure for conducting in-person
and photographic lineups." 4
K. Post-Conviction-Habeas Corpus
The habeas corpus statute generally requires an inmate to
raise all known claims in the habeas corpus petition. 6 With some
degree of frequency, inmates filed a first petition raising a single
claim regarding the denial of the right to appeal. 447 Following the
resolution of the appeal, the inmate would then file a second peti-
441. See Act of Mar. 28, 2005, ch. 895, 2005 Va. Acts 1581 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 4.1-305 (Cum. Supp. 2005)).
442. VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-306 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
443. See id. § 8.01-4.3 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
444. Id. § 18.2-434 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
445. Id. § 19.2-390.02 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
446. Id. § 8.01-654(B)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2005).
447. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Angelone, 261 Va. 601, 604, 544 S.E.2d 350, 352 (2001); Bon-
hom v. Angelone, 58 Va. Cir. 358, 362 (Cir. Ct. 2002) (Fairfax County).
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tion raising other claims, only to have it dismissed under the
statute prohibiting successive petitions.44 The General Assembly
had amended the statute to permit an inmate to file a petition
that raises a single claim seeking a delayed appeal; thus, a sub-
sequent petition will not be treated as an improper successive pe-
tition." '9 This change essentially aligns Virginia law with federal
law in this circuit.450 The inmate can also seek a delayed appeal
by filing a motion in the Court of Appeals of Virginia."' This mo-
tion must be filed within six months of dismissal of the appeal or
of the date the judgment became final, whichever is later.4 2
L. Unlawful Refusal
The General Assembly has clarified the refusal statute, specify-
ing that a first offense of refusal is a civil offense. 53 Subsequent
offenses are criminal.4 4 The law also specifies the procedures to
be used in charging a person with refusal.4 5
M. Sentencing
After July 1, 2004, a court can no longer impose a sentence to
the Detention Center Incarceration Program "as an addition to an
active sentence to a state correctional facility."456
Juvenile and domestic relations courts were formerly author-
ized to defer disposition of a juvenile delinquency case for twelve
months.457 The General Assembly changed the law to allow the
court more flexibly in establishing a specific period to defer dispo-
448. See, e.g., Dorsey, 261 Va. at 604, 544 S.E.2d at 352.
449. See Act of Mar. 26, 2005, ch. 836, 2005 Va. Acts 1378 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8 1-654(B)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2005)).
450. See In re Goddard, 170 F.3d 435,438 (4th Cir. 1999).
451. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-321.1 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
452. Id. § 19.2-321.1(A)(ii) (Cum. Supp. 2005).
453. Act of Mar. 26, 2005, ch. 840, 2005 Va. Acts 1427 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-268.3(D) (Cum. Supp. 2005)).
454. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-268.3(D) (Cum. Supp. 2005).
455. See id. § 18.2-268.3 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
456. Id. § 19.2-316.2(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2005).
457. Id. § 16.1-278.8(A)(4) (Repl. Vol. 2003).
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sition based on the gravity of the offense and the juvenile's his-
tory.458
The General Assembly also clarified the law on presentence re-
ports and it now permits a defense attorney to provide a copy of
the report to the defendant.459
N. Sex Crimes
Existing law prohibited nonconsensual filming in restrooms,
tanning booths, and other situations where the victim was par-
tially undressed. 460 However, the statute did not criminalize a
situation where a person, using a device or advantageous loca-
tion, peeked under the skirt or dress to photograph the under-
garments of the victim. The law now prohibits filming or photo-
graphing under such circumstances.461
In addition, actual or "explicitly simulated" acts of masturba-
tion that occur in a public place while others are present, with the
intent that others see the acts, constitute the crime of obscene
sexual display.462
Over the years, Virginia law has gradually eliminated the dif-
ference between sexual crimes committed against a spouse and
against other victims. This past session, the General Assembly
excised from the Virginia Code vestigial language relating to such
now superseded differences.463
The age of the victim under the indecent liberties statute has
been raised from thirteen years old or less to fourteen years old or
less.464
Juveniles who are convicted in circuit court of a crime for which
registration is required are now required, like adults, to register
458. See Act of Mar. 26, 2005, ch. 810, 2005 Va. Acts 1343 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-278.8(A)(4) (Cum. Supp. 2005)).
459. Act of Mar. 20, 2005, ch. 188, 2005 Va. Acts 286 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-299(A) (Cum. Supp. 2005)).
460. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.1 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
461. See id. § 18.2-386.1 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
462. Id. § 18.2-387.1 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
463. See Act of Mar. 23, 2005, ch. 631, 2005 Va. Acts 854 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (Cum. Supp. 2005)).
464. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370(A) (Cum. Supp. 2005).
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as sex offenders.465 Juveniles adjudicated delinquent of the appli-
cable offenses-as opposed to convicted of the crimes-who are
above the age of thirteen at the time of the offense, may be re-
quired to register if the court finds that the juvenile meets the
specified criteria." 6 In determining whether the juvenile should
be required to register, the court must consider, among other fac-
tors: the age and maturity of the complaining witness and of the
juvenile delinquent, the circumstances of the offense and whether
force was used, the criminal history of the juvenile, and the rela-
tionship of the juvenile and the complaining witness.467
A parent, stepparent, grandparent, or step-grandparent who
sexually abuses a child between the ages of thirteen and seven-
teen is now guilty of aggravated sexual battery.46 In a similar
vein, the definition of "parent" in the crimes against nature stat-
ute is expanded to cover stepparent, grandparent, or step-
grandparent.46 9 Finally, the indecent liberties statute now pro-
vides for enhanced punishment for crimes committed against
children by parents, stepparents, grandparents, and step-
grandparents.47 °
0. Speedy Trial
Virginia's speedy trial statute will now be tolled for natural
disasters, civil disorders, or acts of God.47' Furthermore, the Gen-
eral Assembly clarified that an arrest that begins the running of
the speedy trial statute is "deemed to have occurred only when
such indictment, warrant, information, or presentment or the
summons or capias to answer such process is served or executed
upon the accused .... The lodging of a detainer or its equivalent
shall not constitute an arrest under this section."
47 2
465. See id. § 9.1-901(A) (Cum. Supp. 2005).
466. See id. § 9.1-902(C) (Cum. Supp. 2005).
467. Id.
468. Id. § 18.2-67.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 2005).
469. Id. § 18.2-361(C) (Cum. Supp. 2005).
470. See id. § 18.2-370(D) (Cum. Supp. 2005).
471. Id. § 19.2-243 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
472. Act of Mar. 23, 2005, ch. 650, 2005 Va. Acts 908 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-243 (Cum. Supp. 2005)).
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